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ABSTRACT 
SHANE ELLIOTT: Within the Walls of Work-Topia:  The Continuing Evolution of Capitalist 
Control 
(Under the direction of Arne Kalleberg) 
 
 
 
 The ability of firms to strategically shape the culture of workers has been studied descriptively, 
prescriptively, and critically since the famous Hawthorne experiments.  This study considers the 
extent to which information technology aids management in this project.  Using four years of 
participant observation in a product distribution facility, the author demonstrates how workers 
construct informal prestige hierarchies based on data provided by management.  Workers attempt to 
gain status by “running” or working as hard as their bodies will allow.  The result reduces the cost of 
labor for management.  The informal culture of workers appears to serve the interests of the 
company’s bottom line.  This study adds to the literature in which surveillance and information 
technology have been effectively used as indirect methods of control, supplementing traditional 
methods, thus creating informal control mechanisms within the group.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Each day, more than half a million cases of grocery goods pass through Big Box Product 
Facility (PF) # 0227.  The grocery products enter one side of the building in bulk form, disseminate 
into tens of thousands of holding “slots,” and then, one case at a time, workers manually reassemble 
these products into customized orders which emerge, packed into store-bound trucks, from the other 
side of the facility.  A central computer orchestrates this process, integrating the individual repetitive 
tasks, transforming the warehouse into a seamless, product-churning machine.   
This study examines a kind of work culture which develops within this rigidly controlled 
environment.  In PF #0227, maturing technologies of rationalization turn the warehouse into a digital 
space, and individual workers into atomized avatars playing a game of production.  Within this space, 
orderfillers compete with one another for rewards, prestige and work identities.  They form 
collectives around these competitive identities in ways that benefit the company’s bottom line.  An 
informal hierarchy of prestige emerges, even though intense, over-production is required to achieve 
status within it.  The formal structure creating this level of control is virtually unchallenged; indeed it 
becomes the symbolic material from which identities are constructed.  This study analyzes the 
intertwined nature of formal and informal control strategies made possible through technology and 
bureaucratic procedures, and the implications of a blurred relationship between workers and 
management.  
Within the warehouse, the computer constructs a three-dimensional digital grid out of the 
storage racks; each stored pallet of freight has designated coordinates.  Workers are “on production;” 
they are required to perform according to a minimum standard.  Workers are tracked 
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electronically within the grid.  Inventory software instructs workers where to place stock, or how 
many cases to collect, while simultaneously tracking how quickly they perform these tasks.   
Control is not achieved just through computers.  A maze of policies and procedures obscures 
“right” and “wrong” behaviors.  Work shifts are constructed as collective confrontations with 
volume—the amount of freight that must be handled before shifts can end.  The indeterminate length 
of shifts is a source of social cohesion among the workers, but on terms which benefit the company.  
“Informal” relations among workers are shaped by formal structural contingencies, often in ways 
which facilitate company control.  This study will examine how Big Box cultivates this atmosphere—
and how it narrowly channels workers’ choices and promotes formation of a competitive work 
culture.  Competition among workers enhances managerial control and increases worker exploitation.  
Enhanced control seems to go unchallenged.   
 The sociology of work has a rich history studying control in the workplace (Braverman 1974; 
Burawoy 1979; Edwards, 1979).  Research in this area tends to cluster around two broad tasks: 
characterizing the nature of control in the workplace (Callaghan and Thompson 2002; Hyman 1987, 
Simpson 1985; and many others) and understanding how workers experience that control (Hodson 
2001; Knights and Wilmott 1990; O’Doherty and Wilmott 2009; Thompson and Vincent 2010).   
Evolving information technology and managerial strategy necessitate reconsidering debates in the 
literature about control and autonomy (Crowley 2010; Vallas 2003a.)   
 More than thirty years ago in Manufacturing Consent (1979,) Michael Burawoy questioned 
why workers work so hard.  Observing the work culture of a gear manufacturing plant, he concluded 
that the intra-worker dynamics of management designed production games obscured the reality of 
economic exploitation.  In this paper, I argue that changes in technology, as well as strategic 
application of those technologies, allow managers to design “informal” work orientations into the 
“formal” structure of organizations.  In effect, the manufacture of informal work structure moves up 
the hierarchy.    
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 This paper has three parts: 1) A review of the literature on theories of control which inform 
the analysis; 2) A discussion of site selections and methods of data collection; 3) A description of 
findings arrived at by analyzing the control system which gives rise to the informally constructed 
competitive groups of PF # 0227, and a description of the process which makes this dynamic 
possible.  Appended at the end are some implications this analysis holds for scholars studying the 
sociology of work.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
In Pursuit of Perfect Control 
Since the inception of the capitalist work place, management thinkers have idealized 
purchased laborers as automatons—piston-like pumps within a machine-like process (Ure 1835). 
Since the early twentieth century, scientific research has aided management’s pursuit of that ideal 
(Baritz 1960; Braverman 1974).   As workers continue to contest the conditions under which their 
potential labor is transformed into actual labor (Edwards 1979; Smith 2006), capital continues 
striving for the ideal production process.  The management-worker dialect waxes and wanes over 
control of the workplace, in negotiations that have little bearing on the political economy (Edwards, 
P. 1990; Hodson 2001).  Within the workplace, however, workers maintain the ability to define the 
informal culture, thus resisting managerially imposed norms (Sallaz et al 2009, Thompson 1990).   
In the early 20
th
 century, sociologists sought to improve control, with a benign focus on 
productivity, turnover, and absenteeism in the work force.  Elton Mayo (1924, 1945) hoped to create 
an industrial utopia in the modern world.  His work, reported by Roethlisberger and Dickinson (1939) 
described how workers informally create “norms and sentiments” which define the work experience 
often in ways that are out of sync with the company’s goals.  Mayo assumed that the goals of 
management were rational, while workers who did not conform to them were irrational or emotional 
(Baritz 1960; Perrow 1986).  For much of mainstream organizational sociology, the organization was 
an essentially harmonious entity, one in which the interests of capital and labor should align, and 
conflict was an abnormality requiring correctives (Hill 1981).   
Critical investigations of power and control in the workplace became more common in the 
1970s (Braverman 1974; Burawoy 1979; Edwards 1979).  These studies created a foundation for 
understanding the dynamics by which capitalist-mandated organizations wrestle for control over 
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workers.   Contested Terrain (Edwards 1979) described three steps in the modern control process—
direction, evaluation, and discipline.   According to Edwards, direct, technical, and bureaucratic 
control strategies have evolved to deal with actively resistant workers.  Edwards argued that since the 
political economy creates two groups—workers and capitalists—who have competing interests within 
a work site, control of the labor force must be constantly negotiated and reworked.  Antagonism is 
central to the Edwards formulation as capital seeks, day by day “extract more for less,” and workers.   
Burawoy’s Manufacturing Consent  (1979) addresses issues of worker complicity 
unaddressed by  Braverman and Edwards.  Burawoy described a “game of making out” in which 
workers become so concerned with the uncertainty of maintaining desirable outcomes, that the 
broader exploitation of workers becomes obscured.  This game, which was played in the very same 
piece rate shop of Donald Roy’s (1952) dissertation, has many similarities to the game of “running,” 
or over-producing, I have observed and participated in as an orderfiller in PF # 0227.  For Burawoy, 
the game of making out co-opts worker agency, a necessary component of control.  In other words, 
the workers must cooperate with capital in order for the labor process to be productive.    
Control presumes eliminating worker agency, a key inflection point in the sociology of work.  
While Burawoy was explicitly concerned with how co-opting workers prevents the formation of class 
consciousness and a Marxist revolution, most researchers focus on the negotiations between capital 
and labor which shape worker autonomy (Barrett 2004; Damarin 2006; Hodson 2001; Sallaz 2002; 
Steiger and Form 1991).  These studies tend to emphasize worker’s ability to retain some power over 
the labor process despite the control imperative of capitalist production.   
Normative Control 
Even though labor has little control over broader political and economic terms of work, the 
meaning and definition of the work process is generally construed as a local negotiation between 
labor and capital (Thompson and Smith 2010).  For Burawoy, ideological complicity arose 
informally, at the point of production.  Wider political forces of exploitation become obscured as 
workers engage in games in order to make work meaningful.   Once set in motion, games take on 
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dynamics of their own.  While management creates the conditions out of which games emerge, their 
control over the subsequent culture which develops to reinforce the informal rules of the game is 
vulnerable to worker interpretation, work site logistics, as well as external and internal organizational 
factors. In other words, while Burawoy sees the larger ideological scripts as under capitalist control, 
at the “point of production,” that control is attenuated by factors beyond capitalist control.  Randy 
Hodson (1999) argues that workers maintain considerable power in shaping normative definitions of 
culture, at least in terms of work fairness, justice, and engagement.  These “workplace norms” emerge 
as management appeals to workers’ sense of dignity in order to secure needed cooperation and 
commitment. 
If, however, ideological definitions of work become open to manipulation through managerial 
strategy or technology, labor’s ability to negotiate normative definitions would be severely 
circumscribed.   As mentioned above, Elton Mayo (1945) argued that correctly shaping worker 
ideology would be the key to creating a harmonious industrial state.  While the human relations 
science which sprang from this pursuit failed, its promise proved so enticing to executives, that it 
lived on as human resource management (Baritz 1960; Perrow 1986).   Human resource literature is 
devoted to developing strategies and techniques for increasing the “human capital” of employees, 
thereby creating workers who are more personally invested, competent, and enthusiastic about the 
fate of the firm (Swanson 2009). However, sociologists wonder whether managerial techniques, such 
as job enlargement, Total Quality Management, or “High Commitment Management” really 
empowers workers, or simply rationalizes a higher level of managerial expectations (Rothschild and 
Ollilainen 1999).  Workers internalizing these higher expectations would be accepting a prescribed 
ideological orientation to the position.   
While it is clear many prescriptions for scripting workplace culture exists, sociologists debate 
whether they actually work.  Vallas (2003a) argues that the empirical research is weak.  In Graham’s 
(1993) study of an attempt to implement decentered, indirect control strategies at an automobile plant, 
she found sabotage, distrust, and an informal work culture beyond management’s control.  Similarly, 
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Vallas (2003b) showed that work empowerment strategies are difficult to implement because 
management cannot relinquish control over the labor process.  Thompson and Van de Broek (2010) 
argue that “normative strategies” are difficult to operationalize because so much variation exists 
among researchers as to what constitutes a “normative control.”  For them, all control strategies 
contain some normative element.  
While the results are unclear, it is apparent that management researchers are trying to 
understand ideological formation, in very sophisticated terms, and how to manipulate the 
organizational culture with specific intervention techniques (Ghobadi 2010; Hatch 1993; Schein 
1990).  One then wonders if these attempts to shape culture are impossible, or merely delayed.  If 
ideological control through strategy were achieved, what would it look like?   
Better Ideology through Technology 
Two studies in particular claimed to have discovered cultural control.  Sewell (1998) 
developed a model of ‘chimerical control’ to explain the ideological manipulation found in Kay’s 
Electronics.  He argued that vertical control forces, such as surveillance and management, intersected 
with horizontal forces of peer surveillance to shape the informal work cultures.  While employees 
were given the autonomy to enforce their own norms for rewards and punishments within their teams, 
management information systems kept up-to-date performance numbers for each employee.  The 
subjective experience of worth, Sewell argues, was standardized by the system, and made transparent 
to team members.  A decentralized system of power worked in tandem with a centralized system of 
information gathering to produce higher levels of work intensity, control, and, ultimately, an ideology 
scripted by managerial strategy.  While other case studies have shown that workers can vary widely in 
their reaction to the team ideology (Knights 2000), Sewell’s case study remains as an example of 
what is possible.   
Ideological control was also claimed to be functioning within Fernie and Metcalf’s (1997) 
study of call centers.   Designed to distribute knowledge, call center work requires employees to sit in 
a cubicle with their headset, keyboard, and computer screen.  Incoming calls are routed by a computer 
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system to the first available worker.  Workers must provide emotionally pleasant customer service, 
while following a script, and solving the customer’s problem.  When the call is over, the computer 
tracks how quickly the call was completed, and the next call comes through.  Supervisors can listen in 
on any call to gauge the pleasantness of the employee’s voice or skill in solving the issue.  The entire 
labor process is situated  within a series of centrally controlled software programs. 
 Fernie and Metcalf (1997) called this the ‘electronic panopticon,’ invoking Jeremy 
Bentham’s vision of a perfect system of control through the ever-present possibility of surveillance.  
Indeed, they note that the brochures which sell this system as “Total Control Made Easy” (1997:8).  
While noting the possibility for resistance, Fernie and Metcalf describe the use of teams, performance 
schemes, and transparent productivity to motivate workers.  Informal norms developed among team 
members as they pushed one another to achieve bonus pay.  They go a little too far, however, in 
declaring supervisory power as superfluous, rendered unnecessary due to constant technical 
surveillance.   
For this reason, the ‘electronic panopticon’ became the subject of heated criticism from 
sociologists (Callaghan and Thompson 2001; Taylor 2002; Thompson 2002.)  Critics argued that 
control is not simply accomplished automatically through the system, but that other forms of control 
are still necessary.  For example, call center employees are allowed to take “comfort breaks” 
periodically, which are registered with the system.  If these breaks are inordinately long, management 
might confront the worker about the discrepancy.   Callaghan and Thompson (2001) interpret this as 
an interaction of control systems (direct and technical), arguing that surveillance is merely a resource 
that management can draw upon; it is not an autonomous, automatic system of control.  Taylor and 
Bain (1999) cite evidence where employees managed to subvert the system.  Experienced workers 
can input codes which allow them to temporarily escape the call queue system; they can debate 
management over performance statistics, or just flat our resist management definitions of the work 
(Russell 2008; Thompson 2002; Townsend 2005).   
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Detractors of ‘chimerical control’ and the ‘electronic panopticon’ correctly point out that 
ideological control has not been perfected, even in those examples.  Taylor (2002) argues that nothing 
in call center control subverts the ability of labor to negotiate the work-effort bargain.  Callaghan and 
Thompson (2001) echo this claim, citing examples of employees who are aware of the managerial 
strategy behind the “objective” creation of performance criteria.  For these authors, this awareness 
represents a failure of these control strategies to diffuse, minimize, and redirect resistance. 
I would argue that these writers are using a rather low threshold to define resistance.  Worker 
cognizance of control strategies may not translate into problems for management.  In addition, while 
some individuals may resist the conditions of control, that may not signal an ineffective system.  
Rather, resistance should be analyzed in terms of function, rather than mere existence.   For example, 
“quitting” is considered by Thompson (2002) to be an externalization of resistance.  Human resource 
literature, however, describes ‘sacrificial’ control strategies, in which demanding, stressful 
performance criteria lead to high rates of burnout and attrition (Houlihan 2002; Russell 2008.) The 
“resistance,” then, is actually designed into the system, a formal part of managerial strategy.  
Townsend (2005) celebrates a worker’s ability to fool the system for ten minutes so that he can smoke 
a cigarette as a breakdown in panoptic control.  This resistance seems to be a mere accommodation 
which allows the system to continue functioning.  Following Edwards (1979), resistance should be 
deemed effective when the firm suffers, operations break down, and some new form of control must 
evolve.    
Through an engagement with new technical control structures, the negotiation of work 
identity, informality, and ideological definitions appear to be shifting.  The terrain on which control is 
experienced is therefore shifting.  Human agency has not changed since Donald Roy’s (1953) 
observations of the creative attempts by workers to define the meaning of work.  The context in 
which that agency is realized, however, could be changing.  The complexity with which computer 
technology can standardize work tasks, represent material reality, and define the quality of our 
interaction with those standards creates new working conditions (Frenkel 1995).  The consequences 
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for human subjectivity within these environments are still poorly understood; but it does appear, that 
at the very least, objective performance criteria gives management better control over the employee’s 
subjective experience of work.   
Another example from the call center debate further illustrates this trend.  In the research of 
Winiecki (2007), technological systems combine with management strategy to set the terms for the 
manufacture of worker subjectivity, or management rigs the environment so that only certain kinds of 
work subjectivities are possible.  As management uses statistical data to measure the worth of 
individual workers, workers internalize these measures as objective, and then find ways to appear to 
conform to the standard, a process Winecki calls “shadowboxing with data.”   In some cases this 
requires strategic gaming of the system.  Drawing on Goffman, Winiecki defines these strategies as 
“secondary adjustments,” in which the system is resisted, but on an individual level, which avoids 
organizational detection. Bonuses are paid according to a team arrangement—even though little team 
interaction is required to complete tasks—in order to promote peer enforcement of performance 
standards.  Employees get caught up in these bonus pursuits, haranguing those that hold the group 
back.  Individual employees can collectively or singularly draw upon personal experiences to cope 
with working conditions, resist by exploiting gaps in the system, but ultimately these strategies are 
used to participate in a process of objectification.   
While Barley and Kundra (1992) have shown that managerial strategy cycles over the long 
term between “normative” and “rational,” we cannot discount the possibility that incremental 
improvements in research on informal culture, combined with advancements in information 
technology may result in more effective forms of ideological control, in some contexts.  Normative 
control could become something more than merely rhetoric.  In recent decades, the ability of capital 
to duce complex work tasks to simple routines has increased through computerization (Simpson 
1985), suggesting we could see information technology controlling a wider range of tasks.  What do 
these new forms of hybridized, chimerical control mean for worker’s ability to negotiate meaning into 
the work process?  Can informal control, in some contexts, be achieved through technology, team-
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based organization of work, and heightened surveillance?  My study attempts to addresses such 
questions through an investigation of the form and function of control in a product distribution 
facility.  I am concerned with the kind of informal culture which develops in response to the formal 
control structure, and the degree of influence workers have in shaping the informal definitions of 
work.  If workers are circumscribed, if the informal ideological orientation to work is shaped by the 
formal structure, there may be implications for the experience of work and control.
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
Case Selection and Methods  
The emergence of new technology within the product distribution industry offers an 
opportunity to study the concerns outlined above.  Standardization of performance criteria in the 
warehouse industry has long been a problem, which researchers hoped improved micro processing 
power might solve (Rose and Fergurson 1983.)  This particular site uses computer technology to not 
only standardize, but integrate a wide range of work tasks.  In addition, behavioral research and the 
application of new technology have improved (from management’s point of view) the tools supplied 
to workers.  For example, voice-directed order-selection technology, introduced in the 1990’s, has 
overcome many of the selection and productivity limitations of scan guns (Ludwig and Goomas 
2007).  Researchers argue that, by replacing scan guns with voice activated software, workers can 
more efficiently use their hands.  Furthermore, talk among employees is restricted because of the 
confusion this creates for software (71).  Workers are socially isolated within their tastes and less 
distracted by fellow workers.  Ludwig and Goomas also recommend combining the software with an 
immediate feedback performance system to limit “distal contingencies,” or the amount of time 
between the behavior and consequence, thus preventing “deviant behavior” (72).  In other words, by 
making the performance criteria more immediate and transparent, workers are more likely to respond 
positively to the data.  Research on incentive systems confirms this hypothesis (Bateman and Ludwig 
2003).    
Product Facility #0227 utilizes these techno-behavioral recommendations, along with many 
of the other managerial strategies discussed above.  Teams, surveillance, as well as the traditional 
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forms of bureaucratic and technological control blend together—directing, evaluating, and 
disciplining the work force.  My site offers a chance to study the cultural forms which are possible in 
an environment rigidly controlled through information technology.  
Methods 
This research is conducted using participant observation, which is widely considered an 
excellent way to understand a cloistered social context (Buscetto 2008; Bositis 1988).  Participant 
observation “enables the research worker to secure his data within the mediums, symbols, and 
experiential worlds which have meaning to his respondents” (Vidich and Bensman 1968, quoted from 
Bositis 1988). It is a method of research that allows the researcher to fully identify with the context 
under study.  However, it can be difficult to gain access to interesting sites.  As a worker within the 
site at the time this research began, I had the opportunity to document this work context from a 
unique perspective.   
Getting inside a corporation can be difficult if the company does not understand the study, or 
does not view it as serving profits (Buscatto 2008).  In fact, until the Hawthorne studies and the 
subsequent human relations movement, social scientists from both sociology and psychology were 
universally shunned by managers (Baritz 1960).   Without the prospect of profitability, researchers 
are seen as risky.  Questioning employees about the taken-for-granted assumptions of work life can 
lead to problems for management (Buscatto 2008).  My job eliminated the issue of gaining access to 
the study site. 
Within sociology, covert methodology is considered to be preferable to overt methods of 
observation; the quality of data is less tainted by reactions to the presence of known observers.  
People behave and respond differently when they know they are being watched (Buscatto 2008.)  In 
my research, problems of overt observation are not an issue here.  I was not just an insider, but a 
member of the context in question.  I was in the most privileged position for gathering quality data.  
The problem for me was distancing myself in order to empirically document the context.  Regular 
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conversations with others about my research and my observations
1
 have brought some of these issues 
to the surface.  
The use of covert participant observation normally presents some ethical concerns, but I 
believe my situation circumvents them.  Roger Horman (1980) expressed some of these concerns in 
his piece, “The ethics of covert methods.”  He was researching “language behaviour” among sectarian 
groupings he describes as “old-time Pentecostal.”  Horman chose covert methods because overt 
methods yielded data which were “affecting language-behaviour available for observation” (49). 
Once covert methods were adopted, he was able to gather data which he felt more authentically 
documented the culture of the group, but at a cost. He had problems denying his own religious or 
political beliefs in order to maintain cover.  Also, his extension of friendship was falsely motived.  
“The fieldworker has an ulterior motive of which his subjects are not aware when they kindly invite 
him to tea or shower him with Christmas cards” (54).  Long after completing his field research, his 
feelings of serious guilt lingered.   
As a full participant in the context, my ethical concerns are more limited.  I have not 
presented myself falsely in order to maintain cover, or gain data.  I was an employee of the firm.  I 
genuinely befriended orderfillers; the data gained were a bonus.  I am not using the company’s name 
in my report, so there will be little potential for harming reputations.  These ethical issues pertaining 
to covert observation are mitigated by the fact that my employment began prior to the study. 
 To conclude, I believe my position as a covert participant can be justified because there has 
been little or no ethical transgression.  Most covert participants have had to use cover to gain entrance 
into dangerous or deviant sites (Lauder 2003; Horman 1980; Humphreys 1970).  I am already a 
member of the site, and my conduct at work barely changed as a result of my activity.  In addition, the 
data I gather will be presented anonymously.  Despite this, these data are applicable to a specific, but 
large, industrial population.   
                                                          
1
 Special thanks to Dr. Gary Long. 
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 The weakness of my approach is that I will have limited access to management and company 
level data, and was unable to interview workers.  With access to management, I would be able 
distinguish more accurately between events that are strategic, and those that are happenstance.  
Interviews with management would allow me to analyze the possible conflict and tensions that occur 
between different levels of managerial decision making.  Within the warehouse, smoothly integrated 
control techniques appear to come from some monolithic entity to manipulate workers.  However, 
perhaps this is how events often appear to workers, who may care little about managerial conflict.   
As a member of the context in question, I was not just a “participant observer,” an academic 
who picks a site, then drops in for a few months.  As someone dependent on the wage the job 
provided, my perspective as a worker is fairly unique to the study of workplaces.  From a worker’s 
perspective, how internal control strategy might be the result of political infighting is a nonissue; 
what matters is what the worker must deal with in order to get through the day, remain employed, and 
come back tomorrow.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
Findings 
 My findings demonstrate subtle, non-confrontational control measures which operate on the 
individual externally as well as internally to direct, evaluate, discipline, and reward performance.   
Formal mechanisms create a highly scripted, routinized experience of work.  Informally constructed 
standards increase the intensity, pace, and difficulty of labor.  Managers and workers share in this 
informally constructed standard for evaluating employee worth.  While ideology functions to create 
consent among workers to work these conditions, the ideology is formulated less on employees’ 
terms, and is experienced as more of an aspect of the “objective” environment.   What appears to be 
informal, “normative,” or negotiated between labor and management is actually scripted through the 
formal structure.    
To make this argument, I will first describe the firm, and the level of control.  Then I will 
develop descriptions of technical and bureaucratic control to argue that control is subtle, self-directed, 
internal as well as external.  Next, I will describe the informally constructed ideologies which develop 
in the warehouse to argue that the informality which does exist is beneficial to the company in the 
long run, and to the individual only in the short term.  Finally, I will discuss some implications these 
findings hold for the sociology of work.   
PRODUCT FACILITY # 0227 
The non-unionized parent firm of PF # 0227 operates internationally, with multiple sites.  
About 800 people work at this particular site, which distributes groceries to nearly 80 stores within its 
region.  Well-paying jobs are scarce in the local area.  Despite the challenging working conditions, 
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workers would commute as much as an hour or more for a job in this facility.  the chance to work 
here.  Once an individual survive the initial training phase of employment, turnover is low. (On the 
occasions I have seen people quit, they did so during their first few weeks).  People in the area 
surrounding viewed employment at this facility as highly exclusive and desirable.  “I work at the PF,” 
could be said with a certain amount of pride.  The high wage and social prestige, combined with the 
lack of a union, all enhanced managerial control within PF # 227.  In order to set up my discussion of 
the control strategies, I will first describe the labor process.  
 Each day, the PF received two to three hundred thousand cases of grocery products, and 
ships out roughly the same amount.  The overall task of managing this flow of goods, from receiving 
to shipping, is divided across several repetitive jobs.  All of the workers performing these jobs are 
directed by a central computer, which dispenses the task, micro-manages its accomplishment, and 
evaluates how quickly it was performed.  Very little communication among workers is required.   
On Dry side
2
, all activities—from Receiving to Shipping—take place in one, rectangular 
room; perhaps two and half football fields wide, and three football fields long.  One end receives 
products; the other ships them out. Within this large room are thirty-nine rows of racks, each 
alphabetically encoded.  The racks stand about forty feet high, with four and sometimes five levels, 
122 open spaces—slots—per level, which can hold two pallets at a time.  Within each “slot” are two 
rails, embedded with small wheels which allows orderfillers—who manually “pull” cases one at a 
time over the course of a shift—to remove the empty pallet, and pull forward the full pallet.  Each 
rack has a “pick side,” and a “put away side.”  On the pick side, orderfillers “pull” or “pick” cases 
from the pallets resting in the “slots,” and stack them onto their pallets.  On the put away side, fork-
lift drivers raise pallets to their designated slots, or retrieve pallets to keep the “pick slots” filled for 
                                                          
2
 See Appendix A 
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orderfillers.
3
  Each slot is coded in a numerical pattern specifically designed to promote orderfilling 
accuracy, and nearly 20,000 occupy dry side alone.   
Each Big Box employee has a specialized task in guiding the flow of merchandise through 
this digitally-encoded space.  The Receiving crew consists of “unloaders,” “labelers,” “haulers,” and 
“lift drivers.”  Respectively, they unload the bulk goods from trucks, enter the merchandise into the 
Big Box inventory system, take the pallets to their designated aisles, and, finally, insert the pallet into 
its software-determined location in the grid.  Shipping consists primarily of “orderfillers,” “lift 
drivers,” and “loaders.”  Together, they assemble groceries into requested orders, keep slots filled 
with stock, and load completed orders onto the trucks traveling to various clients served by the PF.   
Orderfillers constitute the modal and most physically intensive job in the warehouse.  Pallets 
once received as bulk goods must be manually broken-down and reassembled into specific orders 
requested by the retailer.  On second shift (from 4-12 pm), individual orderfillers typically hand pull 
anywhere from 1500 to 2000 cases, a total of 30,000 to 40,000 pounds of freight.  This number varies, 
depending on how fast an orderfiller is “running.”  It was not atypical to see someone pull 3000 cases; 
which meant lifting close to 60,000 pounds in a single shift.   
A wireless minicomputer directs orderfillers in their tasks.  The “unit,” weighing about two 
pounds, curved slightly to fit the contour of the hip, requires workers to log on by listening to the 
prompts from the attached headset, select their user ID number, and then verbalize a password.  Each 
worker’s user settings has software which has been trained (during Orientation) to recognize his/her 
voice.  The unit’s voice can be adjusted by speed of talk, pitch, gender.  Orderfillers can also train 
their units to hear certain numbers as words of their own choosing.  A hunter might use “bird,” or 
“duck” to mean “one” or “two.”   One worker uses a lot of hip-hop slang.  Another uses parts of the 
female anatomy.  Some use names, which I assume are those of their children or their wives.  And 
                                                          
3
 On Dry side, this arrangement creates social distance between orderfillers and liftdrivers.  The pick sides face 
each other to create “orderfilling aisles,” which only orderfillers will populate.  The put away sides create “put 
away aisles” which only lift drivers and haulers will utilize.  On Perishable, the liftdrivers and orderfillers use 
the same aisles, creating more interaction between these individuals.  
20 
 
still, some use impersonal words, such as “green,” or “black,” or some other color.  While these 
preferences seem to give workers the power to personalize their interface, they also could be viewed 
as contributing to a more isolated work experience.  
Furthering the individualization, constant communication with the unit will be necessary for 
orderfillers throughout the shift.  Once logged onto the system, the warehouse’s central computer 
immediately begins assigning “trips” to the orderfiller, which is an assortment of grocery products 
requested by a client store.   To complete the trip, the orderfiller must communicate with the unit to 
learn where the needed cases are located, and how many to collect.   
After generating a trip, the computer also calculates how long it should take an orderfiller to 
pull that trip.  The travel time between each slot is calculated, the weight of each case, and the 
number of stops in the trip each enter into an equation which determines the standard time. Once an 
orderfiller receives the trip, queued up via headset, and completes it, the actual time an orderfiller 
takes is then divided into the standard time, and multiplied by 100.  This results in a percent 
performance.  After each trip, the unit will politely inform the orderfiller as the performance of the 
last trip, as well as the cumulative performance for the day.  The unit, then, is both the orderfiller’s 
personalized supervisor and evaluator. 
During any consecutive, four-week period, orderfillers must maintain a 95% percent 
performance average, or face disciplinary action.  Orderfillers are also the only workers who receive a 
bonus for working a rate higher than the minimum production standard.  The incentive bonus caps 
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at 130%, and appears on each pay check.  The incentive formula is complex (experienced orderfillers 
make a higher incentive), but can add several hundred dollars per bi-weekly check.     
The labor process within the PF has many moving parts.  Workers within the facility use both 
machines and computers to move freely about the physical space, manipulating freight as directed.  
The next section describes how the “potential labor” individuals possess is converted into the labor 
power which Big Box desires.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
The Illusion of Omniscience 
 Big Box seeks to create the illusion of omniscience in the warehouse in a variety of ways.  
Constant surveillance—both electronically and by paper—creates data for Big Box to individualize 
workers, and hold them accountable to very specific employee behavior and performance standards.  
While this system of control is not entirely perfect, Big Box attempts to create that impression.  The 
illusion interacts with and is enhanced by mystified rules, computer surveillance, documentation of 
events or deviant acts to elicit worker self-monitoring.  This section analyzes the formal components 
of control as facets of a single project: creating an efficient, autonomous worker.  Following Edwards 
(1979) technical, bureaucratic, and social controls function to direct, evaluate and discipline, but in 
ways that are non-confrontational and impersonal, thus restricting the workers ability’s to negotiate or 
influence the terms of control.   
Computer Conscription 
As mentioned in the description, a central computer directs, monitors, and evaluates worker 
performance.  Workers plugged-in to this rigidly controlled environment do not need to walk, talk or 
think (very much) to collectively move several hundred thousand cases of merchandise each day.  
They interact very little with respect to the labor process. The entire receiving and shipping process 
can be executed with very little verbal communication between workers.  Sometimes trips on the 
shipping dock get misplaced, and the loader must resolve confusion with the wrap machine worker. 
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By and large, “hiccups” in the system are handled by the coaches,4 whose job mainly consist of 
keeping the facility functioning within pre-determined parameters.  Workers need only communicate 
with a computer interface, and operate their equipment; the central computer coordinates and 
integrates the tasks.  Employees are the human components within a massively complex 
computational process, designed to move as much merchandise as quickly as possible.   
Workers “log in” to this system using a password and an identification number.  Like the 
products this process has been designed for, they become denizens of a digital space.   In this 
environment, human supervision of work has been nearly erased.  Computers both direct and evaluate 
worker compliance with tasks; tasks which have been assembled, in large part, by computers as well.  
The “coaches” are nearly as powerless as workers in this environment.  There is no assembly line to 
stop, or machine to shut down.  Orders drop in, almost magically, from the sky each night, and each 
day they must be shipped out.  Trucks appear in the yard, and they must be received.  A formula 
determines exactly how the coach is to deploy his/her tasks as well.  Technical control of this work 
process is nearly complete. 
This differs markedly from the context which Burawoy (1979) describes in Manufacturing 
Consent.  To “make out” for example, one had to learn the informal lay of the shop: who to befriend 
in the tool department, the line managers to schmooze to get the gravy jobs now and again.  
“Informal” becomes a negotiated network of human to human interactions which must be maintained 
in order for the individual to “make out” and become a respected employee.  No such environment 
exists within Big Box.  “Informal” interpersonal relationships develop, naturally, but they are not 
integral to the functioning of the facility.   
The technical control in Big Box subtlety directs and evaluates employees.  No supervisor is 
watches to determine whether or not individuals do their jobs correctly and efficiently.  The computer 
determines the performance level, and employees accept these circumstances with little complaint.  
The human-computer interaction is so well-designed that confusion or misunderstanding is rare.  
                                                          
4
 The euphemism Big Box has chosen for its managers. 
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Technological glitches do occur, but they are usually managed by exchanging equipment.   The 
coordination of action and the evaluation of performance fade into the background, becoming instead 
a subtext for the daily reproduction of culture.  Like the work places observed by Sewell (1998) and 
Frenkel (1995), informal work culture uses objective performance criteria as resources in the creation 
of norms and values.      
Bureaucratic Mystification 
In PF # 0227, formal, bureaucratic policy serves to direct and evaluate what technology 
cannot.  If workers consistently fail to perform, electronic information documenting their 
shortcomings flows seamlessly into bureaucratic channels for disciplinary action.  In an environment 
of symbiotic technical and bureaucratic control, the informal work structure all but vanishes. 
Within the PF, documentation is ubiquitous.  From hiring to firing, workers are tracked and 
evaluated by formally defined, organizational criteria.  The “coaches” hire workers into formal job 
descriptions, and seek employees with qualities specified by the “home” office (Edwards 1979).   
Because the technical control reduces the need for human supervision by managers, they have more 
time to focus on paperwork.   A massively complex paper trail documents the movement of people 
and resources.  Most shifts have only two assistant coaches, one who monitors numbers on process 
flow, numbers and stock levels, another who handles the paper work.   
Each week employees sign their “roll-ups,” computer print-outs of the prior week’s 
production performance.  A signature indicates that the number was accurate.  If there is a 
discrepancy, an employee can argue that some downtime was not counted, or some procedure did not 
work correctly.  Here, though not necessary to the functioning the system, some informal interaction 
does occur, as managers must decide whether or not to believe an employee based on personal 
knowledge and trust of the employee.  Usually knowledge and trust are founded on the employee’s 
production performance.   
Each time an employee operates a piece of machinery, they must sign a “238 form,” located 
in little metal slots on each piece of equipment in the warehouse.  If “Asset Protection” discovers an 
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unsigned form, the miscreant will receive a “coaching”—the euphemism used in Big Box to denote a 
documented infraction of the rules.   If that equipment has a defect, for example, a huge dent in the 
side, a coach must sign the 238 form, indicating the dent pre-existed the oncoming shift worker.  If 
unsigned, the operator of the moment can be “held accountable” for that damage, which means a 
“coaching.”  The phrase, “held accountable,” in itself speaks volumes about the logic behind 
disciplinary policy.  Accountability is not related to guilt or innocence; it means only that Big Box 
will assign blame to individuals who fail to protect themselves by following procedure.   
Responsibility is allocated bureaucratically, not empirically.  Irrespective of who actually damaged 
the equipment, someone will be held responsible. 
When Big Box does assign blame, it is recorded on the worker’s “Matrix,” a paperwork web 
for tracking infractions.  Failure to sign a 238 would be a Safety violation.  Remaining categories are 
Housekeeping, Attendance, Production, and Other.  I am uncertain how many different infractions are 
possible.  Here is a brief list:  Failing to stop and blow the horn of the jack at the firewall entrance 
(the nickname for the entry-way between the Perishable Receiving and Perishable Shipping areas), 
breaking a case of product, pulling incorrect cases, not “cleaning as you go,” calling in sick, being 
late, failing to take a lunch break if more than six hours on the clock, bleeding or otherwise sustaining 
as injury, or cleaning the assigned aisle improperly at the end of the shift.  Some of these I will 
expand on later.   
The Matrix is designed to absorb many hits; a worker would have to be written up in one 
category many times over before being disciplined.  It is a system which allows Big Box to hold 
workers accountable for a wide range of infractions, without any single infraction constituting a threat 
to the worker’s job. (I will cover the exceptions shortly.)   Undesirable events in the warehouse, such 
as injuries, broken cases, or other accidents, are not allowed to be just accidents.  There are no 
accidents at Big Box.    
Big Box strips workers of a language to explain accidents through the use of formal policy. 
Someone did something wrong, even if no one knows exactly what that was.  For example, one day, a 
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pallet of bleach snapped in half as a lift driver pulled it out of the rack.  Cases of bleach rained down; 
the metal cage surrounding her lift protected her, but she was still “coached” because of the damaged 
cases of merchandise.  The coach who gave her the coaching apologized.  He knew there was nothing 
she could have done differently, but Big Box still had to hold someone accountable.  Six months later, 
the event “fell off,” her record was expunged permanently of the infraction.   Only a pattern of 
dropped pallets, or other kinds of safety violations, would jeopardize her job.   
What can and cannot be put on the Matrix is a hot topic among workers at the PF.   For 
example, 
One day, while orderfillers were waiting in line, I heard a less experienced person asking 
another, “I’m only working six hours tonight, do I need to take a lunch?”5  The other said, 
“Ask that man right there,” and pointed to a senior person in line.  He responded, “What do 
we need to know?”  He seemed anxious to be helpful, as if he might understand his role as 
the elder—someone who had gained experience dealing with this maze of rules, and could 
share his knowledge with a younger person.  After hearing the question, the older employee 
said, “You don’t have to take a lunch, but you gotta be off the clock in less than six hours.  If 
it’s one minute over, it’s a coaching.”   The younger employee nodded his approval toward 
the help.  
 
 No one asked for clarification of this rule.  On the surface it appears arbitrary.  Undoubtedly, 
there is a good reason why Big Box created this rule, perhaps conforming to state or locally mandated 
labor laws, but those reasons are of little consequence or interest for the employees.  Rationalization 
has reached the point of mystification, and workers are well beyond that point.  It has been assumed.  
Workers rarely probe into the reasoning behind specific Big Box policies.     
Anxiety over write-ups, what they might mean, and how events might affect the Matrix is real 
for employees.  Mystification of rules creates ambiguity for workers, which is a constant feature of 
work life inside the PF.   
Tonight I ran into a worker who had just come from taking a drug test.  Somehow he tore up 
a dock plate with the forks on his jacks.  He was counting to me the different things he had 
been written up for recently.  He forgot to sign his 238; that was an automatic “step.”  Then 
there was an “event”…now this…he is not sure how bad the write-up will be.  Because the 
damage cost over $500, he had to take a drug test.  He felt like he would be okay, but he was 
                                                          
5
 This refers to clocking out for thirty minutes.  The time clock will not allow employees to clock back in until 
one second past 29:59 minutes.   
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very nervous and unsure.  I found out later he was placed on “D-Day,” but was able to avoid 
getting fired.   
 
 
The above example illustrates worker’s worry over write-ups which regularly occurs after a 
worker has been “caught” in some deviant act, such as damaging equipment, or sustaining or causing 
an injury.  In these instances, workers try to figure out how events will be located on the steps of their 
Matrices, and how damaging they will be to their records.  To clarify a disciplinary outcome, I once 
had to wait a whole week after nearly crushing someone’s foot with a lift (fortunately, the other 
worker’s foot was just sprained and bruised.)  A committee which meets only once a week had to 
determine whether to classify the mistake as a “Step One” or “Step Three” safety violation.  A Step 
Three would have put my job in jeopardy for six months.  Until this occurred (three years into my 
employment) I had no idea such a committee even existed.  
In the sociology literature, critical descriptions of bureaucratic control paint mechanisms 
which promote self-regulation among workers (citing?).  Within PF #0227, ubiquitous documentation 
and mystifying rules serve self-regulating functions, but in a more developed state because of 
advanced information technology.  Each individual is defined, for the organization, by a profile, 
generated by data gathered through the Matrix and performance tracking software, which flow 
seamlessly into rationalized rules and procedures.  Workers learn over time how to perform so that 
their data profile is acceptable, while also manipulating this data for personal gain. For example, I 
often hear workers bragging “my Matrix is clean” while threatening to do something brash, such as 
walk out during a shift, or call in sick on the first day of hunting season.  Likewise, orderfillers keep 
track of their performance indicators religiously, some to know how hard they must work today, 
others to know how much they can slack off, or others to determine how much they need for a good 
incentive.   
   Completing the Illusion 
 So far, I have described the technical and bureaucratic and controls which function to subtly 
exert external and internal pressures upon warehouse workers.  However, these systems of control are 
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not perfect.   Gaps and blindspots exist within this near totalizing structure, which the experienced 
employee learns to game.  Big Box seems aware of this, and to counter the possibility of worker 
deviance,  Big Box presents their techno-bureaucracy as omniscient; no transgression can escape its 
gaze.  In this sense, a strategy of control operates, one that Foucault (1977) might have predicted, 
which is intended to elicit  employee self-regulation.   Big Box depicts its control as perfect; the work 
processes within PF # 0227 are precise, and coaches have perfect knowledge of all events in the 
warehouse.  I am not arguing that a Panoptic system exists, only that Big Box seems intent upon 
constructing such a system.  
This illusion of perfect awareness begins in orientation.  Here, new hires, myself among 
them, heard several stories about Big Box catching transgressors, such as when managers ran a sting 
operation to catch a suspected meat thief.  Lying to a coach meant automatic termination.  As our 
orientation trainer put it, “And if they ask you about something, you had best tell the truth because 
they probably already know the answer.”  Later on, a different orientation trainer repeated the lesson 
another way.  He told us of the security tapes that are in the warehouse.  Apparently, they were 
watching the tapes one day and noticed an employee pocketing a candy bar.  That worker was fired.  
A third orientation trainer had still another way to demonstrate Big Box’s omniscience.  She said, “I 
know sometimes, it is close to lunch, and them strawberries start smelling pretty good.  But is it really 
worth your job?”   
These messages are intended to make employees believe that surveillance is ever-present.  
When I began working, there was another orderfiller on my shift who had started just two weeks 
before me.  One night we were cleaning an aisle, and he said, “You know, this job isn’t so bad.  When 
I was in orientation, they made this place sound like a prison.”  I laughed and asked, “Did they tell 
you the candy bar story?”  He nodded, and we both had a good laugh about it.  I began to realize that 
Big Box’s system of control was not perfect, just made to appear perfect.  
With pervasive computer tracking and a constant pattern of paper documentation such as 
signing the 238, Big Box creates the illusion of omniscience.  For example, we were told in 
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Orientation to do our best with each trip, because “that trip has been electronically assigned to you, 
and it has your name all over it.”  However, I later learned that trips are randomly audited.  In a given 
year, only about one percent of any worker’s trips are audited.  Because the Quality Assurance 
department performs nightly checks of the orderfilling slots, Big Box knows in the aggregate how 
accurate the system is functioning.  For individual orderfillers, however, it is a kind of honor system.  
Big Box’s claim to perfection breaks down in some places, but only through experience with the 
system.  Big Box could not perform more audits, and keep these products flowing in and out of the 
building at a smooth pace.  So, while mystifying the rules keeps workers in the dark about what is 
right and wrong, the reality and the illusion of constant surveillance should make workers feel as if 
they had better be doing the right thing. 
Taken together, an environment of taken-for-granted constant surveillance is created.  For 
example,  
During a survey, employees were shuffled into a computer lab decorated with camouflage 
bunting to match the survey’s theme, “Hunting for a great AOS.”  As one worker sat at his 
desk to begin the survey by checking boxes about his experience at Big Box, he noticed a 
wooden duck on top of the computer.  He asked the human resource director, “What is that 
duck for?” The director replied, “Oh we got cameras in its eyes so we can see what ya’ll are 
marking.”  The employee froze, and the director laughed, “I’m just messing with you; the 
survey is totally anonymous.”  The employee did not share in the laugh.   
 
The worker’s response to this interaction demonstrates an employee who has internalized an 
awareness of surveillance.  The human resource director obviously has a different experience of the 
work environment and perhaps does not realize the sense of inescapability created by the constant 
electronic and bureaucratic surveillance.  To the employee, the idea that cameras might be in the duck 
seemed momentarily plausible, and not the least bit funny.  
Warning signs amongst employee lockers remind everyone that these are the property of Big 
Box and are subject to search at any time.  Taken together, with the mystifying rules, the constant 
surveillance, technical control and the ubiquitous documentation, Big Box creates an omniscient 
image for its employees. In effect, this turns each employee into a self-regulated worker, subtly 
directed by an array of technological and organizational strategies intended to illicit complicity in the 
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most efficient manner possible.  In such a well-controlled environment, one begins to wonder how 
“culture” might be possible.   
Taken together, the bureaucratic and technological mechanisms operate internally and 
externally upon individuals to produce conformity.   Bureaucratic mystification creates internal 
pressures, teaching employees how to protect themselves from infractions. The technological system 
externally directs, but fear of how the electronic monitoring system is calculating performance is 
more internal.  Workers do not know how their actions translate into performance until after the fact.  
These are the formalized mechanisms of control, functioning in an interrelated manner.  The 
following sections demonstrate how the formalized structures interact with informal control 
mechanisms to create normative conceptions to work which benefit Big Box. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Autonomous Actor or Puppets with String? 
 So far I have described two traditional methods of control: technical and bureaucratic which 
blend to create an illusion of omniscience.  Socially constructed mechanisms represent a third form of 
control.  These are methods of work force organization, designed by Big Box, which appear to create 
“informal” cultural orientations to work that increase work intensity and circumscribe the potential 
for resistance.     
The Collective Burden  
Big Box strives to accommodate a normative orientation to labor which assumes work is 
distasteful, and should be completed as quickly as possible.  Work tasks are construed as impersonal 
forces which everyone on a particular shift, coaches and workers alike, must band together to defeat.  
Performance under this social form takes on a moral dimension.  Over-producing is not just about 
winning prestige and monetary compensation by the self-interested individual.  It is also about 
helping fellow workers overcome a collective burden, escaping the ‘relative depravation’ of work 
(Burawoy 1979), and going home.   
Big Box organizes work shifts into collective confrontations with a specified “volume” of 
products, an amount of cases that must be shipped or received, depending on the crew, before the 
shift can end.  Shifts are indeterminate in length; each night represents a new challenge.  And no one 
can leave until the challenge is met.  The presence of this challenge is perhaps the most powerful 
force creating cohesion among workers in the warehouse.  Each and every shift, when 
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loaders, lift drivers, and especially orderfillers arrive, the first thing they ask of one another is, 
“What’s the volume?” or “What we got?” or “What’re the numbers?”  Often this knowledge is 
supplied without any prompting.  It was not uncommon for me to walk in, and another orderfiller 
simply say, “We got 58 tonight,” meaning, 58,000 cases must be shipped out before the shift can end.   
Each shift, therefore, constitutes its own Sisyphean mountain that must be climbed before 
anyone can go home.  The start-up meetings always begin with a discussion of these numbers, and 
what level of “team” is necessary to defeat this challenge, within a certain amount of time.  At one 
start-up, the coach gave the orderfillers two choices.  On one hand, they could run 95 “like we did last 
Saturday,” and it would take 8.5 hours to complete the shift.  Or, they could run 110 and make it 7.8.  
“It depends on ya’ll.”  The onerous drudgery of work is taken as a given.  Big Box seems to be 
saying, “We know this work is painful, boring, and difficult.  Now, this is what you have to do to end 
it as quickly as possible.”  During the shift, at each break, the “percent complete” and team 
performance numbers are announced over the PA, informing employees what is left to endure.  
Employees who miss this message will be heard asking about it in the break room.  On every shift I 
have worked, workers and coaches alike celebrated the short, quick shifts, and cursed the long ones.   
In this form of organization, production performance takes on moral significance within the 
group.  If I am only running 95%, I am not letting down Big Box or the coaches; instead, I am letting 
down my fellow employees—those whom I sit with in the break room.  My coworkers must suffer 
onerous drudgery even longer because I am not “pulling my weight.”  The faster one produces, the 
greater is  the contribution to overcoming the mountain.  The slower an individual produces, the more 
that orderfiller is dragging down the group.  This method of organization is not new; the military has 
long understood that once the bullets are flying and the bombs are dropping, “life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness” become meaningless abstractions.  If you are in a foxhole with your friends, 
however, the guys with whom you trained in boot camp, then you are fighting so the group can 
survive and get home.  I am not comparing Big Box to war, but the principle remains the same.   
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During light volume shifts, the crews tend to run harder.  The end is in sight, and more people 
are pulling product at a fast pace to get there.  If the mountain is too large, however, the opposite 
occurs. One particular Friday was the Fourth of July.  The day before, first shift had been bracing for 
a heavy day because, typically, the week before the Fourth is one of the worst all year.  But, it turned 
out to be light volume; only 90,000 cases.  First shift had assumed Friday, the day of the Fourth, 
would be equally light, but the volume turned out to be 120,000.  Hopes of beginning their holiday 
weekend a little early were dashed by the unexpected size of this mountain, and the first shift crew, 
one of the most seasoned in the building, responded by running 98% as a team.  One said, “How did 
you like that volume?  Did you feel like we did when we came in this morning and saw it?”  Another 
said, “We saw that volume this morning and said hell no,” meaning they were not going to work very 
hard.  These orderfillers were expressing sentiments of the collective, consistently using the pronoun 
‘we,’ and how they felt about the workload.  The fact that the crew ran such a low percentage—
anything below 105 is low for that crew—could be seen as a manifestation of the collective’s feeling.   
Even within a culture of exploitive overproduction, exploitation has unacceptable limits.
6
  
Workers are paid by the hour, but the collective goal—which is normatively enforced by 
workers and management—is to defeat the daily mountain of cases and to “go home.”  When workers 
finish shifts early, their paychecks are less.   By organizing shifts as collective challenges against the 
onerous drudgery of work, Big Box creates a game of escaping the meaningless task as early as 
possible.  The incentive—going home—is perhaps more powerful than a larger paycheck because it is 
both more immediate and shared by the informal group.  
 
Rewards and Punishments 
                                                          
6
 More research into how workers resist would be fruitful.  It is apparent that Big Box’s efforts to cover 
exploitation can become strained.  When shifts last too long, workers cannot simply decide to go home.  They 
must stay, or be punished.  The illusion of the game becomes unbearable at that point.  Smaller examples can be 
found in every shift.  For example, at the end of night, several orderfillers will “hold their trip,” meaning they 
slow down, even stopping completely for several minutes between each pick, and wait to hear “all trips have 
been assigned” over the PA.  Interviews with orderfillers would necessary to fully characterize the nature of 
worker resistance. 
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Volume as the basis for social organization creates an informal system of rewards and 
punishment to reinforce this normative distaste for work.  At the end of each night, clean-up duties 
are assigned.  Orderfillers are ranked each night according to cases pulled.  Those at the top of the list 
receive the easier duties.  On dry side, these are emptying garbage cans; on perishable, it might be no 
clean-up at all.  Those at the bottom receive aisles that take longer to clean.  This follows from the 
logic of defeating the mountain; run hard and go home early; pull slow and stay late.   
While avoidance of difficult cleaning assignments serves as a motivator during the shift, 
performance also translates into rewards for the next day.   During the start-up meeting, the top 
orderfillers will be rewarded with easier jobs, such as running the wrap machine or chase.
7
  These 
jobs are desirable for nearly all orderfillers on the shift.  Orderfillers are free of the unit and the 
relentless stream of cases to be lifted.  Some who have never run chase or the wrap machine have no 
idea what it is like to do these jobs.  An orderfiller who is rewarded with one of these jobs benefits in 
some less tangible ways.  Even though the announcement of who has these jobs is handled by the 
coaches as a routine aspect of the start-up meeting, to the orderfillers, it is a ritual central to the 
ongoing construction of the status hierarchy.  There are orderfillers who regularly get these jobs.  
When their names are announced, it is seen as business as usual.  If someone new is announced, 
comments are sure to follow.  “Look at him! Running chase,” is one version.  Others might be, “Uh-
oh, Danny must think he’s big time now—he gets that chase every Friday.”  It is almost like a rite of 
passage.  Winning a support job confirms an orderfiller’s status as someone who can run.  These jobs 
are highly visible; every other orderfiller will see them in this prestigious roles throughout the shift.  
It is also important to note that “winning case count” is not based on production performance, but 
how many cases a worker has pulled—or the amount of effort contributed to defeating the mountain.   
Orderfillers understand the logic behind this arrangement, and informally negotiate to reinforce it.  
                                                          
7
 Running the wrap machine entails taking the trips other orderfillers have completed through a machine which 
covers the rectangular solid of assorted cases with a cocoon of shrink wrap.  Chase involves going behind 
orderfillers and collecting cases that were previously unavailable for selection.   
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One day, in the minutes before the start of my shift, several orderfillers at the time clock were 
talking about last night’s stand-out performer.  This orderfiller had run 163, pulling 400 cases 
per hour (or, he lifted an average of 7200 pounds of freight per hour.)  The orderfiller in 
question was not present yet, but others were bragging on him.  “Let me put it this way, he 
didn’t start until 4 and he came in second.”   Then, before start-up, I heard this hero-
orderfiller telling someone “Man I feel it too.”  The other said, “I bet you do,” in reference to 
the soreness he experienced.  Once start-up got underway, the coach awarded chase to a 
different orderfiller; he had picked the most cases, but with a three-hour head start.  The 
second place orderfiller, who had run 163, looked like someone had punched him in the gut.  
Then, the chase winner pointed out the discrepancy, the coach apologized, giving chase to the 
orderfiller who had pulled the most per hour, and everyone had a good laugh about it.   
 
The hero-orderfiller had been counting on the reward; it was on his mind, probably as a 
saving grace, from the first moment he began to feel sore and weak from the previous night’s effort.  
Having it taken away was painful.  For the crew, it was also painful, and equally a relief when the 
situation was corrected.  Rewarding chase to the top orderfiller is a ritual, central to the legitimacy of 
over-production.   
In summary, when work shifts are organized to defeat a specified amount of volume, an 
informal, worker-constructed sense of obligation to fellow employees arises.  In this context, rewards 
and punishments for performance make sense.  Coaches, likewise, are bound to the fate of the crew; 
they cannot go home until everyone is finished.  Control is accomplished subtlety, through a 
combination of external and internal pressures. 
Management thinkers learned the importance of informal “norms and sentiments,” as they apply to 
work, in the Hawthorne studies of the 1930s (Roethlisberger and Dickinson 1939).  Human Resource 
Management is built upon this understanding.  The usual question has been how to get the goals of 
the informal group to align with the goals of the formal structure (Perrow 1986).  Inside PF #0227, 
volume, the mountain of cases to be pulled every shift serves exactly this purpose.  Producing 
becomes a moral activity that is reinforced by rewards and punishment.  
It is difficult to label these socially constructed meanings as “informal.”  The line between 
formal and informal becomes blurred, almost indistinct in some cases.  What is clear, however, is that 
these normative, informal dimensions are constructed out of a formally constructed, “objective” 
structure.  The informal dimensions form in ways which benefit Big Box, and circumscribe the 
36 
 
possibility of workers developing alternatives.  The actual mechanisms which direct and compel 
workers, which shape these individuals into collective units moving freight in and out of the building, 
function as a subtext, almost on auto pilot, written into the apparent nature of the organization.   
95 is Failure 
An employee’s ideological orientation to work is shaped through normative controls.  Work 
becomes seen as distasteful, production speed helps everyone escape the drudgery. This section 
describes a second form of informal worker culture which benefits the company.  Among orderfillers, 
the formal structure appears to successfully create conditions such that an inescapable competitive 
culture pervasively defines the experience of work.  Over-production becomes a symbolic resource 
which seems to subvert the economic rationality we might expect, given the existing incentive 
structure.  This over-production ideology develops informally, and is reproduced through the cultural, 
human-to-human interactions.  It uses resources structured by the firm to economically benefit the 
firm at the expense of the employee.   
As Table 1 illustrates, the incentive to over-produce is effectively utilized by Big Box to 
drive labor costs down.  I should emphasize, this table is not based on actual data, but, on my 
employment history with the firm.  These numbers are estimated to illustrate a trend.  The harder 
orderfillers pull, the more Big Box saves in labor costs for the shift, even if every orderfiller on the 
shift is receiving a full incentive amount.     
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Table 1 
The team average of 
30 orderfillers 
95% 115% 130% 
Total Actual Minutes
8
 15,158 12,522 11,077 
Length of shift in 
hours 
8.42 6.96 6.15 
Orderfiller Labor 
Cost
9
 
$4294.76 $3547.86 $3138.46 
Incentive Cost
10
 $0 $532.1 $954.97 
Lift Driver and Loader 
Labor Cost
11
 
$1431.4 $1183.2 $1045.5 
Total Labor Cost $5726.16 $5263.16 $5318.93  
 
Note that the crew collectively working at 115 percent has saved Big Box $682 in labor costs 
compared to the 95 percent crew.  That is only one shift.  Five shifts ship product out every day at the 
PF.  If each one collectively ran 115, PF #0227 would save $3410 per day, and if they could maintain 
that average for the entire year, it would save $1,241,240 in labor costs.  Given the fact that the 
perishable and freezer crews habitually run over 130 percent, these estimations could be rather 
conservative.  At any rate, I am only using them to illustrate Big Box’s stake in cultivating this 
culture of competition.  
But what about the cost to an individual orderfiller?  Does not a running orderfiller make 
more money than a walking orderfiller?  The answer is no.  The orderfiller on the crew that ran 95 
percent would have worked 8.42 hours at $17 an hour, for a total of $143 dollars.  The orderfiller on 
the 130 crew worked only 6.15 hours, but at $20 per hour.  His total for the night would have been 
$123.  The lower producing orderfiller made $20 more than the high-producing orderfiller.  
                                                          
8
 The total amount of time it took all orderfillers to complete all trips on the shift. Assumes a baseline of an 8-
hour night if thirty orderfillers averaged 100 percent production.  
9
 Assuming an average of 17$ per hour for the orderfillers. 
10
 Assuming a generous 3 dollar per hour bonus for those running 130 or better.  For the first column, no 
orderfillers receive this bonus.  For the second column, I assume 15 orderfillers ran 130 and receive the full 
bonus, and 15 orderfillers ran 100 and receive no bonus; for the last column, all orderfillers receive this bonus.   
11
 Assumes 5 loaders and 5 lift drivers with an average pay of 17$ per hour.  These workers produce no 
incentive cost.  
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Orderfillers running 160 and 170 make even less money.  The catch 22-for orderfillers is this.  The 
orderfiller running 95 percent on the 130 percent crew makes only $104.  Therefore, if everyone else 
is running, the orderfiller who wants to maximize his pay must either convince everyone to slow 
down, or run him/herself.   
Incentive structures like these have existed since the days of Fredrick Taylor (1998).  Since 
the Hawthorne electric experiments, informal work groups have been observed creating culture 
orientations which restrict output, or are otherwise hostile to management’s interests (Burawoy 1979; 
Perrow 1986; Roy 1954).  These informal norms are generated by labor, in a negotiation with 
management.  In PF # 0227, the informal culture, shared by workers and managers alike, seems to 
find over-production morally desirable.    
The orderfilling culture draws upon data from the computer tracking system, such as case 
count and production performance, to shape one’s subjective experience of work.  To achieve 
acceptance and status among peers, one must be able to “run,” or over-produce above the minimum, 
95% performance standard.  Running is a physical engagement with the products—how they are 
pulled as well as how they are stacked—and a mental engagement with the technology used to move 
the product—reading the check digits and utilizing the unit.  It is also extremely taxing.  Despite these 
difficulties, many orderfillers have pushed themselves to pull as hard and as fast as they can.  Daily 
competitive games, rewards, prestige, and even punishments or shaming revolve around rankings 
produced by the structure, culture, and technology of the warehouse.  The ability to participate in the 
competition shapes one’s identity at work.   
Shift-specific hierarchies emerge through a direct translation of performance metrics.  At the 
top is the alpha orderfiller.  Generally, he
12
 can run 170 to 200 percent.  He may or may not run this 
way often, maybe only once or twice a year, unless someone challenges him to a race.  He may run 
this way several times a week, or he may “coast” at 130 just to max out his incentive pay.  It depends 
on the orderfiller, and on the shift.  Some areas of the warehouse, such as Meat and Produce, have 
                                                          
12
 Female orderfillers can rarely go beyond the 130 mark. 
39 
 
easier production standards.  Hence, 120 percent on Meat and Produce does not carry the same 
amount of prestige as 120 percent on Dry.  Specific meanings for these numbers are negotiated by the 
work crews themselves.   
Experienced crews, where most of the orderfillers have been together for years, are filled 
with regular runners, while a young weekend crew might only have a few workers who can run.  
Some crews will have several alpha, and might be referred to as “the big dogs.”  Below them are 
groups of regularly competing orderfillers who can run somewhere between 130 and 150.  These 
orderfillers ordinarily win the chase or wrap machine jobs, and frequently talk with one another about 
how fast they are running, or what kinds of trips they are getting.  These constructions are fairly 
stable.  Once an alpha ascends, they rarely fall.  At the bottom of this hierarchy are those who can just 
“run production.”  They might make it to 95, or even 110, but rarely above that.  These orderfillers 
never win support jobs, everyone knows they do not run, and this is generally tolerated.  The belief is 
the production numbers reveal some innate aspect within each worker: some are runners, others are 
not.  Those that just “run production” tend to socialize with one another, but they are not necessarily 
shunned by higher producers, since it is usually assumed they are performing at maximum level.  
Those who demonstrate the ability to overproduce, or who are young and appear physically fit yet 
never attempt to run, are usually looked down upon with disdain for not working up to their apparent 
capabilities.  
Each orderfiller has a reputation fixed within this hierarchy.  His/her work identity is 
presented to other employees in relation to this hierarchy.  If a worker breaks the pattern, especially if 
a non-running orderfiller begins running, it becomes the subject of conversation, an oddity that must 
be explained.  For example, one night on Meat and Produce, a universally disdained orderfiller began 
the night running 150 percent.  Everyone was shocked.  It was the hot topic in the break room and 
bathroom conversations.   Jovially, everyone kept asking him what was wrong; what’s “gotten in to 
him.”  He had deviated from worker’s understanding about the current hierarchy, in a way that made 
everyone happy for him.  
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The effort to distinguish between those who run and those who do not became clear within 
the first few hours of my first day at PF #0227.  After orientation, I got “out on the floor,” and I 
remember being mildly surprised to find that the front line workers used the same standards for 
measuring each other as the managers.  My previous work experience had taught me to expect a 
significant gap between what employers preached, and what employees did.  These gaps certainly 
exist at Big Box, but in this most salient aspect of the distribution process—orderfilling—the 
informal work culture and the formal culture seem to share the same standard.  On that first night, in 
the break room, after the initial conversation consisted of orderfillers confessing their production 
performance thus far, my trainer began playfully chastising the crew for the not running hard enough.  
I asked what it meant to “run.”  He said,  
“It depends on the shift.  Like the guys on this shift, no one can really run that well. Maybe 
140 or 150.  I can run,” he started pointing people out in the break room, “He can run, him, he 
can’t run.”   He went through the ten males who were in the booth tables in the break room.  
They just kind of nodded or smiled, embarrassed.  “Now, if you want to see some people that 
can really run, come in on dayshift.  Those guys clock out with 160 or 170.”  And he shook 
his head in amazement.  
 
The tone of the conversation indicated that an orderfiller’s production speed directly 
informed his/her level of prestige.  There were those that could run, and those that could not.  
Throughout the night, he would differentiate between the two.  One orderfiller, Pat, was generally 
disdained by the entire troop.  The trainer called him, “One of those that really tries to run but can’t.”  
Apparently, this put him at the very bottom of the hierarchy.  The trainer, apparently, could run, but 
chose not to.  Because of a charming, jovial nature, he was generally accepted amongst most of his 
peers.    
In order to be accepted as a competent, competitive orderfiller, one needs to win “case count” 
at least once or twice.  Each shift constitutes a daily challenge for orderfillers: case count
13.  “Racing” 
is the term when two or more orderfillers are competing for next day’s prize—either chase or the 
                                                          
13
 Case count is a separate measure of one’s production performance.  Case count simply refers to the total 
number of cases an orderfiller has pulled, percent performance refers to how quickly those cases were pulled.  
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wrap machine.  Sometimes races occur spontaneously in the course of the night.  Sometimes 
orderfillers plan to race in advance.  On other occasions, coaches actually plan the races.  In the most 
extreme form, racing can occur when one orderfiller challenges another:  
While working second shift perishable, I saw one especially brash orderfiller begin to pick on 
a quieter orderfiller in the break room.  Both were known to be high-producing workers, but 
the brash one wanted to prove he was the better of the two; he kept asking for the other to 
name a day in which they could settle the matter with a race.  The quieter one kept refusing, 
saying the other would cheat by getting help with cases, or he would cancel the race at the 
last minute.  This went back and forth for several minutes.  Finally, an assistant coach walked 
by, and was pulled into the discussion. 
The brash one, Charlie, asked the coach, “John, who would win between me and Bruce?” 
John said, “Charlie, I don’t want to get you into something you can’t get out of.” 
Charlie appeared incensed by the comment, “John, John, are you saying, really saying, that 
Bruce could beat me?” 
“Charlie, you start out way up here,” the coach held his hand high to show that Charlie, the 
brash orderfiller, would begin the night producing at a high percentage, “then you drop off.  This man 
(indicating Bruce) can maintain.” 
 
This interaction is not unusual.  It occurs in a number of ways on a regular basis on the 
various shifts which I have worked.  Management, worker, and the overt control structure 
(percentages tracked by computer) interact to produce this exchange.  Charlie knows that John, the 
manager, watches their performance ebb and flow on a computer screen during the shift, and this 
knowledge is in fact relied upon to settle a dispute.  These two never did race, but, thereafter, I would 
often playfully invoke Bruce’s name to Charlie, who would become defensive at the accusation that 
he could not defeat Bruce in a race.  In this example, surveillance, performance objectives, and 
management become resources for employees to construct competitive identities.  There was no 
hostility in the exchange; its resources were invoked by both orderfillers.  The alpha orderfiller may 
have won, but the beta orderfiller still received prestige as someone who can compete, someone who 
does belong as a productive orderfiller.   
Orderfillers, when running, invest themselves heavily in the small details of how a shift 
progresses, and how particular trips can be beneficial or problematic to “getting case count.”  Trips 
vary greatly in the number of cases, and in the number of slots required to retrieve those cases.  The 
standard of comparison, cases pulled, is not reliable.  So orderfillers sometimes qualify their 
42 
 
competitive losses by discussing the kinds of trips they, or others, were getting.  One night as I was 
leaving, I saw James, who explained why he unjustly lost the previous night’s race.  
Trey beat me, he ran 140, I ran 151, but he just kept getting all the good trips.  I mean he beat 
me by 297 cases, but…his first trip was 344 cases, an N thru Q.  Then he had an H where he 
picked 190 out of that slot 444.  I was getting E,F,P,Q,R, HV:D.  110 cases in a 40-minute 
trip.  But he fell off the pace…I never fell off.   
 
The structure, the resources with which these orderfillers create their status is not questioned.  
The fact that trips are assigned, randomly, and that Big Box has constituted these trips to maximize 
the movement of product, rather than according to an equitable distribution of cases, is all assumed.  
It sometimes feels as if trips just fall out of the sky.  Orderfillers rarely, if ever, question why or how 
trips are created, or even how standard times are computed.  These structures are taken as givens, the 
task of presenting oneself as a worthy, competitive individual worker follows from them.     
At other times, races can become regular competitions between a handful of orderfillers.  
Rather than being a challenge, these orderfillers habitually “run,” and end up running on the same 
nights.  (Most orderfillers do not run on consecutive nights; it is too taxing on the body.)  During the 
course of the shift, they will check the case count screen, and the competition can intensify if two 
orderfillers at the top are very close to one another.  One night, I was running, and noticed I was only 
50 cases behind the top orderfiller.  My adrenaline shot into overdrive as I tried to make up those 
cases.   
Another night, on second shift dry, I looked at the final case count to find, surprisingly, 
Donald had the top spot, which might have been the first time for him to get it.  He is widely known 
for his poor stacking, and the frequency with which his trips fall over in the wrap machine, rather than 
for his ability to run.  After signing the clean-up list, I got on my jack to ride away, and Trey, an 
orderfiller who regularly runs (but came in second place tonight) came over to ask, “Who is 728?” 
(On the case count screen, only our associate numbers are shown.)  
I said (jokingly), “It’s your arch enemy.”   
He looked confused, “No, James is 635.”  (On most nights, James and Trey compete for first 
place.) 
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“No, it’s Donald Lassiter.”  A stunned look came over Trey’s face.  He could not believe he 
had been beaten by that orderfiller (Trey ran 12 points higher than Donald, but lost by 16 
cases).   
 
Again, our interaction presumes a structure of impersonal surveillance, and out of that, 
workers construct identities as competitive orderfillers.  I presented myself as someone who 
understands the positioning within the hierarchy by playing with a reputable orderfiller’s, Trey’s, loss 
to a disreputable orderfiller, Donald.  Trey responds as someone who is properly indignant, but in 
sporting fashion.  He sought Donald out and the two had a jovial exchange over the “upset” victory.  
Sixteen cases is an incredibly small margin by which to lose.  In many ways, “winning” or 
“losing” a race comes down to the luck of the draw.  Two orderfillers, running the same percent 
performance, can have very different case counts.  Racing, as a contest, is riddled with contradictions.  
Unlike “real” competitive sports, the losers do not really lose anything.  In the National Football 
League, for example, players and coaches lose their jobs for failure to produce consistent victories.  
And unlike competitive sports, no effort is made to level the playing field through comparable trips.  
These inconsistencies are readily accepted by orderfillers.  They know luck is involved in the 
outcomes, but that does not taint the contest for them, nor their commitment to it.  Orderfillers are 
attempting to create meaning within a meaningless activity.  If we think of trips, cases, and percent 
performance as tools, it does not matter to orderfillers where these tools come from, how they were 
made, or for what purpose.  What matters is how these tools can be used to earn prestige.  
Over-producing orderfillers earn the respect of their fellow workers, and prestige from their 
coaches.  An individual’s work identity is shaped in relation to a competitive hierarchy.  Orderfillers 
either run, or do not; it is the first and foremost criterion for measuring the worth of an orderfiller.  
Some orderfillers seem to desire this reputable status, and therefore push themselves physically and 
mentally to achieve higher and higher levels of production.  Those who do not run have established 
justifications.  It may be as simple as, “I’m not one of those orderfillers,” or “They’re only getting 95 
out of me,” but it still must be negotiated against the assumption that overproducing is good.    
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Stacking is another way to differentiate orderfillers, but it does not have the same weight as 
production speed. Gossip about others occurs within these two dimensions: running and stacking.  
“He can’t stack…,” or, “he can run, but his stacking’s horrible.” I remember a tale about one 
orderfiller, “That m-f can run 170 and stack like that (a perfect cube).”  Some would say, “I may only 
run 120, but my stacking is perfect.”  Stacking is a matter of personal pride, and it bears only slightly 
on a worker’s identity.  Those who ran 170 but stacked shakily are still at the top of the food chain.  
To stack well or not is a choice; production speed is not.  Orderfillers running only 95 percent are not 
treated with the same respect.   At the heart of it, running is about earning informally generated 
respect and prestige.  The higher percentage an orderfiller can run, the more he/she will have.  
However, the foundation for these rewards is structural, scripted into the “objective” environment.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
Conclusion 
The question now becomes, how is this possible?  How does the intense pursuit of prestige in 
a work game become a way for workers to reduce their incomes? Incentives cannot explain the whole 
story.  Big Box pays more if workers run harder.  Presumably, some workers would choose to make 
incentive payment, and others would not.  That is certainly the case.  Recall from Table 1, however, 
that minimum production only leads to lower wages if everyone else is over-producing.  If everyone 
worked at a slower pace, everyone’s hours, and pay, would increase.  Technological and bureaucratic 
isolation could explain why groups do not form with this intention.  
Instead, over-production becomes morally important to the group.  Orderfillers who run are 
helping the crew meet a challenge.  In addition, the incentive does not explain why some workers, or 
even some entire crews, regularly run 140 percent, or why anyone would ever want to run 200, which 
is high enough to become an alpha orderfiller.  In addition, incentive pay does not explain the 
hierarchy.   If workers were only concerned with making money, they would care little about daily 
competitive challenges.    
I argue that Big Box has structured the environment so that even though competition is not 
part of the official rhetoric—it is not preached or encouraged—it still makes sense.  In fact, Big Box 
explicitly tells its managers not to berate individuals or crews about their production performance 
(although it still happens.)  But, even though managers do not ask orderfillers to run, it is rigged into 
the environment.  Big Box has structured its work environment so that certain behaviors become 
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prevalent, despite the fact that managers do not ask explicitly for these behaviors.  How does this 
occur?    
To begin with, Big Box strives to make the formal control structure invisible.  Control in this 
facility is achieved through policy or technology, which appear to the worker as a natural, 
commonsense way to run an operation.  As a result, there is no culture of managerial control against 
which a worker culture forms in opposition.  Managers even have a title, “coach,” which suggests 
they are on the same side as workers, who also have titles, “associates,” suggesting they have some 
power over the resources or goals of the company.  The rules governing this relationship are 
somewhat murky, however.  Policies are presented to workers in a piecemeal fashion, like shards 
from a shrouded monolith.  Workers must learn what is right and wrong by treading carefully through 
a regulatory environment that is set against them.  Control is through self-monitoring; because 
workers do not know right from wrong—they must either err on the side of caution, or rely on the 
manager for guidance.  
The assignment and evaluation of labor is on “autopilot.”  Managers check the gauges via 
computer screen, and make adjustments as needed.  Workers have clear direction; when it comes to 
production rates, there is no mystification.  Control is objective and “natural,” stemming from a little 
device at the worker’s hip, or the scan gun, or the computer screen.   The authority directing the 
worker to act is hidden within these devices.   
Instead of human managers soliciting effort through direct supervision, there is formal talk 
about safety and cleanliness.  The rhetoric employees do hear from coaches is, “Be safe.”  It is 
invoked at the end of every start up, and it is the first thing workers see when they walk in the door.  
And at the end of every shift, the exhortation: “Let’s get a good clean-up tonight.”  Maybe Big Box 
cares about safety and cleanliness, but there is no doubt that managers care about is production.  As a 
result, workers proudly display their own anti-safety rhetoric.  They can thumb their noses at safety, 
and hide broken cases of spaghetti beneath a rack, and feel as if they are resisting.  
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With safety and cleanliness opposed, Big Box has cleared the runway so that orderfillers will 
form collectives valuing something.  This Big Box cannot offer, at least not explicitly.  This must 
come from the workers themselves—if it is to be binding.  The foundation for this morality comes 
from the indeterminate shift length.  Because no one can go home until the cases are shipped or 
received, collectives form within shifts to meet this challenge.   
Running hard, or over-producing, now has an immediate benefit for everyone on the shift: 
they can go home early.  The immediacy of this benefit—a shorter shift—supersedes the monetary 
loss (see Table 1.)  The loss of money, if noticed, is not apparent until payday.  Rewards, 
punishments, and prestige reinforce the competitive legitimacy.   In short, Big Box succeeds in 
aligning the goals of the informal culture with those of the formal structure by making the sources of 
control non-human, and by rewarding high producers with a shorter shift.  These strategies are 
conscious and direct.  Wired into the wireless unit, orderfillers become avatars in a digital space.  
Case count and percent performance becomes their scores.  They just happen to be shipping groceries. 
The ability of firms to strategically shape the formation of informal groups appears to be 
growing.  While previous studies have found examples where attempts to co-opt the informal work 
group have failed (Graham 1993; Knights 2000; Vallas 2003b), this study adds to the literature in 
which surveillance, information technology, and team-based organization have been effectively used 
as indirect methods of control, supplementing traditional methods, thus creating informal control 
mechanisms within the group (Fernie and Metcalf 1997; Sewell 1998; Winiecki 2007).   
In the workshop observed by Donald Roy (1952) and Michael Burawoy (1979), employees 
were engaged in production games which allowed them to take some pleasure in their work.  Roy 
even talks about finishing early, then “loafing conspicuously” in front of the bosses.  He grew to hate 
the gaze of management.  Burawoy (1979) speaks of informal protocols which guided the production 
process.  One had to develop relationships in order to make production.  Managers would sometimes 
try to impose formality on the labor process—usually in ways that created bottlenecks and 
inefficiency.  This would infuriate workers who would be unable to make 140 percent of production 
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as a result.  After a few weeks, workers were able to erode the new rules, and get things back to 
normal.   
Burawoy considered these two studies as examples of worker’s conformity to capitalist 
profiteering overriding their own political interests.  I would also add that it demonstrates ways in 
which the informal, worker generated culture can contest formal managerial strategy.  The informal 
culture restricts the power of management.  In both cases, workers succeed in negotiating, shaping, 
and defining the terms of their work culture.   
In Big Box, such outcomes are rare.  Control mechanisms are difficult to shape because they 
are minimized, impersonal, and unobtrusive.  Direct control is less necessary as part of daily 
operations; contested interactions between workers and managers exist, but they are usually about 
“coaching” someone on how to conform to the system.  Control does not have to be interpreted 
through personal relations with authority figures.  
In this competitive, highly routinized environment, where the perfection breaks down, is 
resistance possible?  Probably some level of personal, individual resistance should be expected in any 
coercive job.  Big Box is no exception; for orderfillers, there are numerous ways to resist by gaming 
the system.  For example, I could call out a case to the unit as if I have picked it, but put nothing on 
my pallet.  If my trip were audited, I would be coached for a minor offense.  Leave out more than a 
few cases, however, and your trip starts to look a little strange.  It is not clear how extensive this 
practice is; no one ever talked about it (the sense of being watched was ever-present).  Yet I suspect 
some must have, given how easy it was.   
 After working as an orderfiller for three years, I transferred to the lift driving position.  The 
competitive culture was non-existent, though management still tried to encourage it.   Our “numbers” 
were read in ranked order during daily start-ups.  New hires cracking the top three might get a slap on 
the back, but otherwise it is business as usual.  Lift drivers do not celebrate over-production.  There is 
no incentive for lift drivers.  Despite this, seasoned lift drivers regularly tried to get %115 or so, in 
order to protect their rolling four-week cumulative performance against a bad day.  In addition, lift 
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drivers get assigned one set of aisles at the beginning of the shift.  The difficulty of those aisles, a 
daily question mark, is, once determined, fairly stable for the whole day, and prescribes the number of 
“moves” one driver can make.  There is some variation for effort and skill, but it is not prevalent in 
conversation or in rewards like it is in orderfilling.  As a result, lift drivers do not compete.  The few 
crews I observed are an isolated lot; I suspect this is the case because so little of their work allows for 
interaction with others.  In fact, on the crew I worked, loaders and lift drivers exhibited a marked 
difference in group cohesiveness.  Perhaps this is a consequence of the way loaders work in constant 
motion on a shared dock.  They have a high degree of daily interaction which allows for sustained 
conversations.  Social integration was higher among loaders than in the lift driving group.   Both lift 
drivers and loaders cases have more control to resist engagement with the work.   This suggests limits 
to management’s ability to inspire efforts in low discretion jobs.  While the similar strategies seem to 
apply to loaders and lift drivers (minus the incentive), orderfilling becomes the competitive arena.   
All three work groups—orderfillers, liftdrivers, and loaders—illustrate the power of the 
structure to shape the informal nature of the collectives.  Orderfillers are hyper competitive.   Lift 
drivers merely get by in isolation; loaders are a congenial group.  Differences are also apparent 
between first and second shift crews—the former tend to be more “uptight”; they work in the 
presence of salaried management.  Second shift, which does not, is markedly more relaxed.  
Perishable crews tend to more close-knit than dry shipping crews.  These differences appear to affect 
the ways workers experience work which is possible—the normative environment appears to hinge on 
these structural variations.   
Spontaneous, human-to-human informality does exist within the warehouse, but its rare—
highlights the prevalence of formal control.   When things break down—pallets fall over, serious 
injuries occur, trips fall over—these events stick out and become “war stories” told to new hires or 
transfers at any opportunity.  If a trip falls over, for example, people come together to pick it up.  The 
orderfiller could be angry or indifferent, but the other workers usually relish the break in monotony, 
and come together to accomplish an informally organized task.  Jovial conversations mark the 
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communal restacking, sometimes even at the end of long shift.  When a pallet of jelly is smashed 
against a rack, managers often take the opportunity to “BS” with a group of employees as they pick 
glass off metal girders.  When there is a break in the ordered flow, informal interaction quickly fills it.  
Managers and workers escape rigidly controlled routines into moments of spontaneous sociation. 
So why, then, does orderfilling take on the competitive imperative which other tasks lack?  
Perhaps there is something in the nature of the orderfilling task—the activity, how it is measured, and 
rewarded—which “fits” with the wider competitive culture in which we all live14.  Video game 
competition is a phenomenon every orderfiller is probably familiar with prior to employment.  If not 
that competition, then some form will suffice.  Perhaps the nature of the technology, which requires 
people to mentally wire into a physically demanding activity
15
, combined with this real time 
performance tracking, have set in motion a unique, idiosyncratic cultural context.   
Still, several questions remain.  How do orderfillers explain their desire to run?  If it is all 
about making incentive for them, why do people want to run 150?  What are the health consequences 
associated with running over long periods of time? This study was not able to answer these questions.  
My position as a covert researcher, unable to interview, prevented me from fully characterizing the 
range of responses to the culture.  In addition, my dependency on the wage left me vulnerable to the 
coercive, demanding aspects of the job
16
, which may have clouded my perception of the control 
mechanisms, or obscured other aspects of the atmosphere which may run counter to my claims.   
Future research to corroborate and build upon these findings is necessary.  Is competition at 
work becoming more widespread?  What are the rules of these games—are they set by the company 
or informally within the group?  As information technology widens the range of activities that can be 
                                                          
14
 Some readers will note the absence of gender in this analysis.  Masculinity no doubt plays a large role in 
motivating orderfillers.  The jobs in the warehouse are not gendered per se.  Males dominant orderfilling, but 
there are no jobs considered female, and they tend to make up a sizable portion of other positions in the 
warehouse.  Without interview or observational data about motives at work, or company data regarding 
workforce composition, little data were available for an explicit analysis of the gendering process.   
 
16
 For example, twice I have had a “mandatory work day” added to my schedule before a holiday, usually with 
just a few days notice. 
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packaged into a performance metric, how will people respond to the heightened, transparent pressure 
to perform? Competition is as old as society, but is something new being created in the interaction 
with computer technology?  
In addition, the power of information technology to shape the labor process increases as jobs 
become more difficult to find.  Economic restructuring in the face of international competition is 
leading us into an era of precarious work in the formal sector (Kalleberg 2009).  Employers are 
returning to ‘neo-Taylorist’ forms of recruitment and retention, which involves selecting the “right” 
(i.e. high energy individuals who never complain and easily adapt) person for the job, also, periodic 
layoffs are used to motivate employees (Crowley 2010).  As these forces converge, the ability of 
workers to resist demeaning, stressful, or overly-intense work conditions could diminish significantly.   
The power which shapes this context is so totalizing, so encompassing, it is barely a part of 
worker’s daily awareness.  Our knowledge of how groups can rescue meaning from meaningless 
activity has been extended, but no one should be surprised.  After all, did the collectives forming 
several millennia ago to make sense of seasonal weather know any more about their environment?  
Powerless people must still make a life out of the conditions that they face.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
REFERENCES  
Baritz, Loren. 1960. The Servants of Power; a History of the use of Social Science in 
American Industry. Middletown, Conn., Wesleyan University Press [1960].  
Barley, Stephen R. and Gideon Kunda. 1992. "Design and Devotion: Surges of Rational and 
Normative Ideologies of Control in Managerial Discourse." Administrative Science 
Quarterly 37:pp. 363-399.  
Barrett, R. R. 2004. "Working at Webboyz: An Analysis of Control Over the Software 
Development Labour Process." Sociology (Oxford) 38:777-94.  
Bositis, David D. A. 1988. "Some Observations on the Participant Method." Political 
Behavior 10:333-48.  
Braverman, Harry. 1974. Labor and Monopoly Capital : The Degradation of Work in the 
Twentieth Century. New York: Monthly Review Press.  
Burawoy, Michael. 1979. Manufacturing Consent : Changes in the Labor Process Under 
Monopoly Capitalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Callaghan, G. G. 2001. "Edwards Revisited: Technical Control and Call Centres." Economic 
and Industrial Democracy 22:13-37.  
Crowley, Martha M. 2010. "Neo-Taylorism at Work: Occupational Change in the Post-
Fordist Era." Social Problems (Berkeley, Calif.) 57:421-47.  
Damarin, A. A. K. 2006. "Rethinking Occupational Structure: The Case of Web Site 
Production Work." Work and Occupations 33:429-63.  
Edwards, Richard.  1979. Contested Terrain : The Transformation of the Workplace in the 
Twentieth Century. New York: Basic Books.  
Edwards, P. 1990. “Crawling from the Wreckage: The Labour Process and the Politics of 
Production,” in Knights, David and Hugh Willmott (eds).  Labour Process Theory.  
London: MacMillan Press.  
Fernie, S. and Metcalf, D. 1997. (Not) Hanging on the Telephone: Payment Systems in the 
New Sweatshops, Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics.  
Frenkel, S. S. 1995. "Re-Constituting Work: Trends Towards Knowledge Work and Info-
Normative Control." Work, Employment and Society 9:773-96.  
Ghobadi, Shahla S. 2010. "A Conceptual Model for Managing Incompatible Impacts of 
Organisational Structures on Awareness Levels." Knowledge Management Research & 
Practice 8:256-64.  
53 
 
Graham, L. 1993. "Inside A Japanese Transplant - A Critical Perspective." Work and 
Occupations 20:147-73.  
Grugulis, I. 2000. "Cultural Control and the 'Culture Manager': Employment Practices in a 
Consultancy." Work, Employment and Society 14:97-116.  
Hatch, M. J. 1993. "The Dynamics of Organizational Culture." The Academy of Management 
Review 18:657.  
Hill, Stephen. 1981. Competition and Control at Work : The New Industrial Sociology. 
London: Heinemann Educational Books.  
Hodson, Randy. 2001. Dignity at Work. Cambridge ;New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Houlihan, Maeve M. 2002. "Tensions and Variations in Call Centre Management Strategies." 
Human Resource Management Journal 12:67-85.  
Humphreys, Laud L. 1970. "Tearoom Trade Impersonal Sex in Public Places." Society (New 
Brunswick) 7:10-25.  
Hyman, Richard R. 1987. "Strategy Or Structure? Capital, Labour and Control." Work, 
Employment and Society 1:25-55.  
Kalleberg, A. A. L. 2009. "Precarious Work, Insecure Workers: Employment Relations in 
Transition." American Sociological Review 74:1-22.  
Knights, D. 2000. "Bewitched, Bothered and Bewildered: The Meaning and Experience of 
Teamworking for Employees in an Automobile Company." Human Relations (New 
York) 53:1481.  
Knights, David and Hugh Willmott (eds.) 1990.  Labour Process Theory. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan. 
 Ludwig, Timothy D. and David T. Goomas.  2007.  “Performance, Accuracy, Data Delivery 
and Feedback Methods in Order Selection:  A Comparison of Voice, Handheld and 
Paper Technologies.”  Journal of Organizational Behavior Management.  Vol. 27. p. 
69-105. 
Ludwig, Timothy D. and Melodie Bateman. 2003. “Managing Distribution Quality Through 
an Adapted Incentive Program with Tiered Goals and Feedback.” Journal of 
Organizational Behavior Management. Vol. 23. p. 33-55. 
Mayo, Elton. 1945. The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization. Boston, Division of 
Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University  
54 
 
------. 1924. “Revery and Industrial Fatigue.”  Journal of Personnel Research.  Vol. 3. p. 
273-281. 
O'Doherty, D. D. 2009. "The Decline of Labour Process Analysis and the Future Sociology 
of Work." Sociology (Oxford) 43:931-51.  
Perrow, Charles. 1986. Complex Organizations : A Critical Essay. New York: Random 
House.  
Ray, Carol C. A. 1986. "Corporate Culture: The Last Frontier of Control?" Journal of 
Management Studies 23:287-97.  
Roethlisberger, F. J. (. 1939. Management and the Worker; an Account of a Research 
Program Conducted by the Western Electric Company, Hawthorne Works, Chicago, 
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard university press, 1939.  
Rose, Warren and Wade Ferguson.  1983.  “Improving Materials Handling Productivity 
Using Standard Time Values.”  International Journal of Physical Distribution and 
Logistics Management.  Vol. 13. No. 3. p. 25-47. 
Rothschild, J. 1999. "Obscuring but Not Reducing Managerial Control: Does TQM Measure 
Up to Democracy Standards?" Economic and Industrial Democracy 20:583-623.  
Roy, D. 1952. "Quota Restriction and Goldbricking in a Machine Shop." The American 
Journal of Sociology 57:427.  
------.1954. "Efficiency and" the Fix": Informal Intergroup Relations in a Piecework Machine 
Shop." The American Journal of Sociology 60:255.  
------.1953. "Work Satisfaction and Social Reward in Quota Achievement: An Analysis of 
Piecework Incentive." American Sociological Review 18:507.  
Russell, Bob B. 2008. "Call Centres: A Decade of Research." International Journal of 
Management Reviews : IJMR 10:195-219.  
Sallaz, J. 2002. "The House Rules - Autonomy and Interests among Service Workers in the 
Contemporary Casino Industry." Work and Occupations 29:394-427.  
Schein, Edgar E. H. 1990. "Organizational Culture." The American Psychologist 45:109-19.  
Sewell, Graham. 1998. "The Discipline of Teams: The Control of Team-Based Industrial 
Work through Electronic and Peer Surveillance." Administrative Science Quarterly 
43:pp. 397-428.  
Simpson, Richard R. L. 1985. "Social Control of Occupations and Work." Annual Review of 
Sociology 11:415-36. 
55 
 
Smith, C. C. 2006. "The Double Indeterminacy of Labour Power: Labour Effort and Labour 
Mobility." Work, Employment and Society 20:389-402.  
Steiger T. T. L. 1991. "The Labor Process in Construction: Control without Bureaucratic and 
Technological Means?" Work and Occupations 18:251-70.  
Swanson, Richard A. and Elwood F. Holton. 2009. Foundations of Human Resource 
Development. San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Kohler Publishers, Inc.  
Taylor, P. P. 2002. "Work Organization, Control and the Experience of Work in Call 
Centres." Work, Employment and Society 16:133-50.  
Thompson, P. 2002. "Fantasy Island: A Labour Process Critique of the ‘age of 
Surveillance’." Surveillance & Society 1:138.  
Thompson, P. 2010. "Managerial Control and Workplace Regimes: An Introduction." Work, 
Employment and Society 24:1-12.  
Thompson, P., and Chris Smith. 2010. “Debating Labour Process Theory and the Sociology 
of Work,” in Thompson, P. and Chris Smith. (eds) Working Life: renewing labour 
process analysis. New York. Palgrave MacMillan.  
Thompson, P., and Steve Vincent. 2010. “Labour Process Theory and Critical Realism”  in 
Thompson, P. and Chris Smith. (eds) Working Life: renewing labour process analysis. 
New York. Palgrave MacMillan.  
Townsend, Keith K. 2005. "Electronic Surveillance and Cohesive Teams: Room for 
Resistance in an Australian Call Centre?" New Technology, Work, and Employment 
20:47-59.  
Ure, Andrew, 1778-1857. 1967. The Philosophy of Manufactures; Or, an Exposition of the 
Scientific, Moral, and Commercial Economy of the Factory System of Great Britain. 
New York, A.M. Kelley, 1967.  
Vallas, S. P. 2003a. "Why Teamwork Fails: Obstacles to Workplace Change in Four 
Manufacturing Plants." American Sociological Review 68:223.  
------. 2003b. "The Adventures of Managerial Hegemony: Teamwork, Ideology, and Worker 
Resistance." Social Problems 50:pp. 204-225.  
Winiecki, D. J. 2007. "Subjects, Subjectivity, and Subjectification in Call Center Work: The 
Doings of Doings." Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 36:351-77.  
 
 
